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We study a local interaction model where agents play a inite n-person game following a perturbed best-response process with
inertia. We consider the concept of minimal p-best response set to analyze distributions of actions on the long run. We distinguish
between two assumptions made by agents about the matching rule. We show that only actions contained in the minimal p-
best response set can be selected provided that p is suiciently small. We demonstrate that these predictions are sensitive to the
assumptions about the matching rule.
1. Introduction
here is an extensive literature on evolutionary game theory
which investigates the long-run outcomes when a population
of boundedly rational agents uses simple rules of adaptation
to recurrently play a game in normal form. hese models
allow for sharp-equilibrium selection results in some classes
of games withmultiple equilibria. Such an equilibrium can be
interpreted as a convention, that is, a pattern of behavior that
is customary and expected and regulates much of economic
and social life (for a survey, see, among others, Young [1]).
A common assumption in this literature is that interactions
among agents are local and not global. Each individual may
bematched according to somematching rule with a subgroup
of the overall population to play a game (for a survey, see, e.g.,
Weidenholzer [2]). In this paper, we assume that agents have
no information about this matching rule. As a consequence,
we elaborate two alternative scenarios corresponding to dif-
ferent assumptions made by agents about the matching rule.
his point can be interpreted as a consequence of bounded
rationality: agents only have an imperfect representation of
their environment. We use the concept of (minimal) �-best
response set introduced by Tercieux [3] to make predictions
for the long-run behavior of the population of agents (this
concept is used by Durieu et al. [4] in a ictitious play model
with bounded memory). We establish that such predictions
are possible for the whole class of inite �-person games. We
also study how assumptions about the matching rule afect
these predictions.
Precisely, we consider a inite population of agents located
at the vertices of a chordal ring, that is, a ring topology in
which each vertex has additional links with other vertices. In
particular, we focus on chordal rings of degree 2�,� ∈ N,
constructed by adding at each vertex 2� − 2 chords with
its closest vertices in a ring network. In order to deal with
asymmetric inite �-person games, we distinguish between
� classes of agents. A speciic role in the game is assigned
to every class. Each agent of each class is located at exactly
one vertex and two agents of the same class are located in
diferent vertices. In this way, each vertex contains exactly �
agents. he game is played recurrently. At each period, one
agent of each class is drawn at random to play the game.
However, players’ identity is not revealed. At the beginning
of every period, each agent of each class observes the actions
that the agents of other classes located in vertices linked with
its own vertex has chosen in the previous period. He uses
this information to estimate the probability distribution on
the action proiles played by his potential opponents in the
current period.hese estimations depend on the assumptions
made by agents about the matching rule. Each agent believes
that he can be matched with agents located at vertices linked
with his own location. Precisely, we consider the following
two scenarios. In the irst scenario, each agent assumes that
his potential opponents are drawn jointly by location. In
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the second scenario, each agent assumes that his potential
opponents are drawn independently. For both scenarios,
agents may have the opportunity to choose a best response
to their estimation.he concept of �-best response set allows
us to study the way in which the distribution of actions that
people take in the � classes evolves over time. We show that,
for both assumptions about the matching rule, only actions
contained in the minimal �-best response set can be selected
on the long run provided that � is suiciently small. For each
assumption, an explicit bound of � is given, and we analyze
how this critical value evolves when � increases.
Ellison [5, 6] considers a similar local interaction struc-
ture: agents are arranged on a ring improved by adding chords
between vertices in a regular form. However, since Ellison
[5, 6] focuses on symmetric two-player games, each vertex is
associated with one agent and each agent has full information
about the matching rule. Ellison [5] considers a symmetric
2 × 2 coordination game. he model predicts that the risk-
dominant equilibrium is selected on the long run. Ellison [6]
shows that in a symmetric � × � game, the 1/2-dominant
equilibrium, if it exists, is selected on the long run. Alo´s-
Ferrer andWeidenholzer [7] consider the weakened solution
concept of globally pairwise risk-dominant equilibrium and
show that this equilibrium, if it exists, is selected in a symmet-
ric 3 × 3 coordination game played by agents arranged on a
ring.However, a generalization of this result to a larger class of
games is not possible. Indeed, Alo´s-Ferrer andWeidenholzer
[7] present an example of a 4 × 4 coordination game in
which the globally pairwise risk-dominant equilibrium is
not selected on the long run. From this point of view, the
concept of minimal �-best response set is interesting. Since a
minimal �-best response exists in every game, it allows us to
investigate the long-run outcomes in the whole class of inite
�-person games. Moreover, since the concept of minimal
�-best response set generalizes the concept of �-dominant
equilibrium [8], the result of Ellison [6] is a particular case
of our result.
he paper is structured as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces notations. Section 3 introduces the concept of �-best
response set. Section 4 introduces the learning model. In
Section 5 we present the main results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Notations and Definitions
Let ⊆ denote weak set inclusion and let ⊂ denote proper set
inclusion. We denote by ⌈�⌉ the smallest integer greater than
or equal to �. For any inite set �, Δ(�) denotes the set of all
probability distributions on �.
Let Γ be a inite �-person strategic-form game. Let ��
be the inite set of pure strategies �� available to player � ∈
� = {1, 2, . . . , �}. We write Δ(��) for the set of probability
distributions �� over �� for each � ∈ �. Let ��(��) denote
the probability mass on strategy ��. Deine the product set
� = ∏�∈���. Let Δ(�) be the set of probability distributions
on �. Let �−� = ∏� ̸= ��� denote the set of all possible
combinations of strategies for the players other than �, with
generic elements �−� = (��)� ̸= �. Let Δ(�−�) be the set of
probability distributions on �−� with generic elements �−�.
We sometimes identify the element of Δ(��) that assigns
probability one to a strategy in�� with this strategy in��.
In this paper, a player’s belief about others’ strategies
takes the form of a probability measure on the product of
all opponents’ strategy sets. We assume that each player �
has expected payofs represented by the function �� : �� ×
Δ(�−�) → R.
For each player � and probability distribution �−� ∈
Δ(�−�), let
��� (�−�) = {�� ∈ �� : �� (��, �−�) ≥ �� (��� , �−�) , ∀�
�
� ∈ ��}
(1)
be the set of pure best responses of � against �−�.
Let � = ∏�∈��� be a product set where each �� is a
nonempty subset of ��. Let Δ(�−�) denote the set of proba-
bility distributions with support in �−�. Finally, ���(Δ(�−�))
denotes the set of strategies in�� that are pure best responses
of � against some distribution �−� with support in �−�; that is,
��� (Δ (�−�)) = ⋃
�−�∈Δ(�−�)
��� (�−�) . (2)
3. �-Best Response Sets
We will now introduce the concept of (minimal) �-best
response set. Let � ∈ [0, 1] and let �−� be a nonempty
subset of �−�. We write Δ(�−�, �) ⊆ Δ(�−�) for the subset
of distributions �−� ∈ Δ(�−�) such that ∑�−�∈�−� �−�(�−�) ≥
�. Let ���(Δ(�−�, �)) denote the set of strategies in �� that
are pure best responses by � to some distribution �−� ∈
Δ(�−�, �) (regardless of probability assigned to other possible
combinations of strategies); that is,
��� (Δ (�−�, �)) = ⋃
�−�∈Δ(�−�,�)
��� (�−�) . (3)
Let us recall the deinition of a strict �-dominant equilibrium
irst introduced by Morris et al. [8] in two-person games and
extended to �-person games by Kajii andMorris [9]. A proile
�∗ ∈ � is a strict p = (�1, . . . , ��)-dominant equilibrium if
for each player � ∈ �
{�∗� } = ��� (Δ ({�
∗
−�} , ��)) . (4)
In the sequel, we focus on the case where �� = � for
all � ∈ �. he concept of �-best response set extends the
concept of strict �-dominant equilibrium to product sets
of strategies. Formally, a (minimal) �-best response set is
deined as follows.
Deinition 1. Let � ∈ [0, 1]. A �-best response set is a product
set � ⊆ �, where for each player �
��� (Δ (�−�, �)) ⊆ ��. (5)
A �-best response set� is a minimal �-best response set if no
�-best response set is a proper subset of �.
Let Q� be the collection of �-best response sets for some
� ∈ [0, 1]. he following lemma states some properties of
minimal �-best response sets.
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Lemma 2. Let Γ be a inite �-person game.
(1) Γ has a minimal �-best response set for any � ∈ [0, 1].
(2) Fix � ∈ [0, 1]. hen two distinct minimal �-best
response sets of Γ are disjoint.
(3) For � ≤ 1/2, there exists a unique minimal �-best
response set in Γ.
(4) Let � ≤ �� ≤ 1/2. Let � and �� be the minimal �-best
response set and��-best response set, respectively.hen,
� ⊇ ��.
For a proof of this Lemma, we refer the reader to Durieu
et al. [4] and Tercieux [3].
4. Adaptive Processes
Following Samuelson [10], we extend the Darwinian process
proposed by Kandori et al. [11] to the multipopulation case.
his extension is quite natural to deal with asymmetric �-
person games. We think the game Γ as having � roles. For
each role � ∈ �, a nonempty class �� of individuals is eligible
to play that role. We assume that each class is composed of�
identical agents, where� is a inite integer.
We consider the possibility of local interactions. Let
�(�, �) be a graph where � = {�1, �2, . . . , ��} is the set of
vertices and � is the set of edges. We assume that vertices are
located increasingly in a clockwise direction around a ring.
We focus on a chordal ring: vertex ��, � ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,�} is
adjacent to the vertices (modulo�) ��±1, ��±2, . . . , ��±� where
2� ≤ � − 1. If 2� = � − 1, then each vertex is adjacent to
each other vertex. For each vertex � ∈ �, denote by �(�) the
open neighborhood of �, that is, the set of vertices adjacent
to �. Since |�(�)| = 2� for each � ∈ �, �(�, �) is regular.
he closed neighborhood of �, denoted by �(�), is deined by
�(�) ∪ {�}.
We assume that each class of � agents is distributed
among the set of vertices �. In other words, each agent of each
class ��, � ∈ �, is located at exactly one vertex of � and two
agents of the same class are located in diferent vertices of �.
In this way, each vertex contains exactly � agents. From this
point of view, each vertex can be interpreted as a location.
We denote by �(�) ∈ � the actions proile chosen by agents
located in � ∈ �. he collection of action proiles chosen in all
locations in � is Θ = ��.
Let � = 1, 2, . . . denote successive time periods. he
stage game Γ is played once in each period. In period �, one
agent is drawn at random from each of the � classes and
assigned to play the corresponding role. We assume that,
at every period, each agent has no information about who
is selected to play each role in the game, only that a given
action is played by someone. his lack of information gives
rise to two kinds of assumptions made by each agent about
his potential opponents, that is, about the matching rule.
Fix a location � ∈ �. In a irst scenario, each agent in � ∈
� assumes that his potential opponents belong to a unique
location in �(�). In other words, opponents would be drawn
jointly by location in the closed neighborhood of his location.
In a second scenario, each agent in � ∈ � assumes that his
potential opponentsmay belong to diferent locations in�(�).
In other words, opponents would be drawn independently in
the closed neighborhood of his location.
We give a formal description of both scenarios. Consider
a time period �. Actions chosen in � by the whole population
are described by �� = (��(�1), ��(�2), . . . , ��(��)) ∈ Θ. Fix an
agent � ∈ �� located in � and an action proile � ∈ �. Denote
by ��� (�−�) the number of locations in �(�) such that ��−�(�) =
�−� in ��. According to the irst scenario, at the beginning of
period �+1, agent � believes that the probability to bematched
with agents playing �−� is
��−� (�−�) =
��� (�−�)
2� + 1 .
(6)
In order to describe the second scenario, it is convenient
for each class�� to identify�� with the set {1, 2, . . . , ��}, where
�� = |��|. For each � ∈ �� such that �� ̸= ��, and each
�� ∈ {1, . . . , ��}, denote by ��� (��) the number of �(�) where
�� is chosen in ��. Consider �−� = (��)� ̸= � ∈ �−�. According
to the second scenario, at the beginning of period � + 1,
agent � believes that the probability to bematched with agents
playing �−� is
��−� (�−�) = ∏
� ̸= �
��� (��)
2� + 1 . (7)
In period �, every agent in each class�� chooses an action
�� ∈ �� according to the following learning rule. Every
agent might receive the opportunity to revise his choice.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that this adjustment
probability does not depend on the agent nor on the actions
chosen in the whole population. Whenever an agent does
not receive a revision opportunity, he simply repeats the
action he has taken in the past. Whenever an agent receives a
revision opportunity, he switches to a myopic best response.
hat is, the agent assumes that the action choices of other
agents will remain unchanged in the next period and adopts
a pure best response against it. Precisely, agent � chooses a
pure best response against the probability distribution on�−�
computed using formula (6) or (7). In other words, we deine
two myopic best-response dynamics with inertia.
If probability distributions are computed using (6), the
dynamics results in a Markov chain on the state space Θ,
denoted by �0� . We refer to it as best-response process with
joint drawing by location. Similarly, if probability distributions
are computed using (7), the dynamics results in a Markov
chain on the state space Θ, denoted by �0� . We refer to it as
best-response process with independent drawing. LetR� (resp.
R
�) be the collection of recurrent sets of �0� (resp., �0� ). For
each � ∈ � and each subset Θ� ⊂ Θ, let ��(Θ�) be the set
of actions in �� that appears in Θ�. he product set of all
actions that appears in Θ� is �(Θ�) = ∏�∈���(Θ). Consider
a minimal �-best response set �. Denote byR�� ⊆ R� (resp.,
R
�
� ⊆ R�) the collection of recurrent sets of �0� (resp. �0� )
such that Θ� ∈ R�� (resp., Θ� ∈ R��) if and only if �(Θ�) ⊆ �.
Observe thatR�� ̸= 0 andR�� ̸= 0 since � is a minimal �-best
response set and thus a 1-best response set.
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Following the literature (see, e.g., [11, 12]), the model
is completed by adding the possibility of rare mutations or
experiments on the part of agents. With ixed probability
� > 0, independent across players and across time, each agent
chooses an action at random. he processes with mutations
are called perturbed processes and are denoted by ��� and ��� .
With these mutations as part of the processes, each state ofΘ
is reachable with positive probability from every other state.
Hence, the perturbed processes ��� and ��� are irreducible and
aperiodic inite state Markov chains on Θ. Consequently, for
each � > 0, ��� (resp., ��� ) has a unique stationary distribution
��� (resp., ���) satisfying ������ = ��� (resp., ������ = ���). he
limit stationary distribution (as the rate of mutation tends
to zero) �∗� = lim�→0��� (resp., �∗� = lim�→0���) exists
and is a stationary distribution of the unperturbed process
�0� (resp., �0� ). he states in the support of �∗� (resp. �∗� ) are
called stochastically stable states and form a subset of R�
(resp., R�). he recurrent sets appearing in the support of
�∗� (or �∗� ) are those which are the easiest to reach from all
other recurrent sets, with “easiest” interpreted as requiring
the fewest mutations (cf., heorem 4 in [12]).
We rely on the identiication of the set of stochastically
stable states developed by Ellison [6]. his identiication
proceeds as follows. Ellison [6] introduces suicient condi-
tions to have a collection of recurrent sets that contains all
stochastically stable states. he analysis uses three measures:
the radius, the coradius, and the modiied coradius. To
illustrate these concepts, consider a collection of recurrent
sets Θ1 ⊆ R�. Let �(Θ1) be the basin of attraction of Θ1,
that is, the set of states � ∈ Θ from which the unperturbed
process converges toΘ1 with probability one. In other words,
�(Θ1) is the set of states � ∈ Θ such that it is possible
without mutation to build a path, that is, a sequence of
distinct states, from � to �1 ∈ Θ1. he radius of (the basin
of attraction of) Θ1, denoted by �(Θ1), is the minimum
number of mutations necessary to leave�(Θ1) fromΘ1, that
is, the minimum number of mutations contained in any path
from a state �1 ∈ Θ1 to a state �2 ∉ �(Θ1). he coradius
of (a basin of attraction of) Θ1, denoted by ��(Θ1), is the
maximum over all states �2 ∉ Θ1 of the minimum number
of mutations necessary to reach�(Θ1), that is, the maximum
over all states �2 ∉ Θ1 of the minimum number of mutations
contained in any path from �2 to a state �1 ∈ �(Θ1). To
compute the modiied coradius of (the basin of attraction
of) Θ1, consider a state �2 ∉ Θ1 and a path from �2 to a
state belonging to Θ1. he modiied number of mutations
of this path is obtained by subtracting from the number of
mutations of the path the radius of the intermediate recurrent
sets through which the path passes. he modiied coradius
of (a basin of attraction of) Θ1, denoted by ��∗(Θ1), is
the maximum over all states �2 ∉ Θ1 of the minimum
modiied number ofmutations necessary to reach�(Θ1), that
is, the maximum over all states �2 ∉ Θ1 of the minimum
modiied number ofmutations associated with any path from
�2 to a state �1 ∈ �(Θ1). Note that ��∗(Θ1) ≤ ��(Θ1)
for every Θ1 ⊆ Θ. Ellison [6] establishes the following
result.
heorem 3 (see [6]). Consider a perturbed process and ix
Θ1 ⊆ Θ. If �(Θ1) > ��∗(Θ1), then the stochastically stable
states are contained in Θ1.
Since ��∗(Θ1) ≤ ��(Θ1), an alternative condition to
have all stochastically stable states contained in Θ1 is that
�(Θ1) > ��(Θ1).
5. Selection Results
Fix a minimal �-best response set �. First, consider the per-
turbed best-response process with joint drawing by location.
We give a suicient condition to have all stochastically stable
states associated with �.
heorem 4. Let Γ be a inite �-person game and �(�, �) a
chordal ring of degree 2�. Let � ≤ 1/� and let � be the
minimal �-best response set of Γ. If � is suiciently large and
� is suiciently small, the perturbed process ��� puts arbitrarily
high probability on a subset Θ∗ ⊆ Θ such that �(Θ∗) ⊆ �.
Proof. Observe that if R�� = R�, then the result follows. In
the sequel, we assume thatR�� ⊂ R�.We break the proof into
three parts.
(1)We give a lower bound on �(R��). Fix a state � ∈ R��,
a location � ∈ �, and two distinct classes �� and ��. Consider
agent � ∈ �� located in � and agent � ∈ �� located in �� ∈ �(�).
Assume that agent �mutates: he chooses at random a strategy
not contained in��.hen, agent � believes that the probability
to be matched with agents playing a vector of actions not
contained in �−� is ∑�−�∉�−� �
�
−�(�−�) = 1/(2� + 1). Now,
assume that � ≤ 2� + 1 agents in �� located in locations
belonging to �(�) mutate and choose an action outside ��.
hen, agent � believes that the probability to be matched with
agents playing a vector of actions not contained in �−� is
∑�−�∉�−� �
�
−�(�−�) = �/(2�+1). Let � be a probability such that
at least one class of agents �� has an action �� ∉ �� as a pure
best response to ��−�, where∑�−�∈�−� �
�
−�(�−�) = �. By deinition
of a minimal �-best response set, we have � > �. A transition
from Θ1 ∈ R�� to any Θ2 ∉ R�� requires at least �mutations
(in locations belonging to �(�) and outside ��), where � is
such that �/(2� + 1) ≥ 1 − �. Otherwise, agent �’s best-
response(s) to ��−� belong(s) to �� since ∑�−�∈�−� �
�
−�(�−�) ≥ �.
Hence, �(R��) is such that �(R��) ≥ ⌈(1 − �)(2� + 1)⌉.
(2)We give an upper bound on ��∗(R��). To do this, it is
convenient to distinguish between two situations according
to the values of � and �. Firstly, consider the cases such
that ⌈�(2� + 1)⌉ ≤ �. Fix a state � ∉ R�� and a class ��.
Assume that, in a location �� ∈ �, (� − 1) agents � ∉ ��
mutate and choose actions in ��. hen, agent � ∈ �� located
in � ∈ �(��) believes that the probability to be matched
with agents playing a vector of actions contained in �−� is
∑�−�∈�−� �
�
−�(�−�) = 1/(2� + 1). Now, consider � ≤ 2� + 1
consecutive locations in�(�, �) denoted by ��, � ∈ {1, . . . , �}.
Assume that in each of these locations (� − 1) agents � ∉ ��
mutate and choose actions in ��. hen, agent � ∈ �� located
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in � such that � ∈ �(��) for each � ∈ {1, . . . , �} believes that
the probability to be matched with agents playing a vector of
actions contained in �−� is ∑�−�∈�−� �
�
−�(�−�) = �/(2� + 1). By
deinition of aminimal�-best response set, agent � has at least
one strategy �� ∈ �� as a pure best response to ��−� ater that all
agents � ∉ �� located in �∗ ≤ 2� + 1 consecutive locations in
�(�, �) belonging to �(�) mutate and choose actions in �� if
�∗ is such that �∗/(2� + 1) ≥ �. Set �∗ = ⌈�(2� + 1)⌉. Since
� ≤ 1/�, if in �∗ consecutive locations, �1, . . . , ��∗ , every agent
� ∉ �� mutates and chooses an action in ��, then every agent
� ∈ �� located in each of these locations chooses an action
in ��. By inertia, it is then possible to reach a state in which
an action proile contained in � is played in �∗ consecutive
locations, �1, . . . , ��∗ . From such a state, it is possible to reach
a state in R�� without additional mutation. Indeed, consider
agents located in ��∗+1. Since ⌈�(2� + 1)⌉ ≤ �, every agent
of each class, ��, believes that the probability to be matched
with agents playing a vector of actions contained in �−� is
∑�−�∈�−� �
�
−�(�−�) = �∗/(2� + 1) ≥ �. hen, it is possible
to reach a state in which an action proile in � is chosen in
�∗ + 1 consecutive locations. Continuing in this fashion, we
can reach a state inR�Y without additional mutation. Hence,
��(R��) is such that ��(R��) ≤ (� − 1)⌈�(2� + 1)⌉.
Secondly, consider the cases such that ⌈�(2� + 1)⌉ > �.
Observe that since � ≤ 1/�, we necessarily have � = 2.
Fix a state �1 ∉ R��. By the above point, we know that
�∗ = ⌈�(2� + 1)⌉ mutations allow reaching a state, denoted
by �2, where an action proile in� is chosen in �∗ consecutive
locations, �1, . . . , ��∗ . If the number of locations belonging to
� \ {��, � ∈ {1, . . . , �∗}} is at most equal to �, then every
agent of each class ��, � ∈ {1, 2}, located in these locations
believes that the probability to be matched with an agent
playing an action contained in �−� is ∑�−�∈�−� �
�
−�(�−�) ≥ �.
A transition from �2 to a state in R�� is possible without
additional mutation and ��(R��) is bounded as above. It
remains to deal with situationswhere the number of locations
in �\ {��, � ∈ {1, . . . , �∗}} is strictly greater than�. In �2, each
agent � ∈ ��, � ∈ {1, 2}, located in these locations believes
that the probability to be matched with an agent playing an
action contained in �−� is ∑�−�∈�−� �
�
−�(�−�) < �. hus, it is
possible that �2 does not belong toR�� nor to the recurrent set
containing �1. However, an additional mutation is suicient
to reach a state, say �3, in which an action proile in � is
chosen in �∗ + 1 consecutive locations. To see this, consider
location ��∗+1. If agent � ∈ �2 located in ��∗+1 mutates and
chooses an action in �2, then agent � ∈ �1 located in ��∗+1
believes that the probability to be matched with an agent
playing an action contained in �−� is ∑�−�∈�−� �
�
−�(�−�) ≥ �.
Using inertia, it is possible that an action proile in � is
chosen in location ��∗+1. By a similar argument, it is possible
to establish that one additional mutation may allow reaching
a state �4 in which an action proile in � is chosen in �∗ + 2
consecutive locations.his argument can be applied until the
number of locations in which an action proile not contained
in � is equal to �. From such a state, it is possible to reach
a state in R�� without additional mutation. Hence, the path
from �1 ∉ R�� to a state inR�� passes through a sequence of
intermediate recurrent sets whose radius is equal to 1. hus,
themodiied coradius ofR�� is such that��∗(R��) ≤ ⌈�(2�+
1)⌉.
Finally, since ��(R��) ≥ ��∗(R��), it holds in all cases
that
��∗ (R��) ≤ (� − 1) ⌈� (2� + 1)⌉ . (8)
(3) In order to apply heorem 3, it is suicient to show
that
⌈(1 − �) (2� + 1)⌉ > (� − 1) ⌈� (2� + 1)⌉ . (9)
A suicient condition to obtain inequality (9) is that
1 − � > (� − 1) � + � − 12� + 1 . (10)
Inequality (10) is satisied provided that� is suiciently large
since by hypothesis � ≤ 1/�, and, by deinition of a minimal
�-best response set, we have 1 − � > 1 − �.
By deinition, if a minimal �-best response set is a
singleton set, then it is a strict �-dominant equilibrium. he
following result is an immediate application of heorem 4.
Corollary 5. Let Γ be a inite �-person game and �(�, �)
a chordal ring of degree 2�. Let �∗ be a strict �-dominant
equilibrium of Γ, where � ≤ 1/�. If � is suiciently large and
� is suiciently small, the perturbed process ��� puts arbitrarily
high probability on a subset Θ∗ ⊆ Θ such that �(Θ∗) = {�∗}.
Observe that if � = 2, Corollary 5 is similar to Corollary
2 in Ellison [6] except that it also holds for the class of asym-
metric two-player games with a 1/2-dominant equilibrium.
Second, we consider the perturbed best-response process
with independent drawing. We give a suicient condition to
have all stochastically stable states associated with a minimal
�-best response set �.
heorem 6. Let Γ be a inite �-person game and �(�, �) a
chordal ring of degree 2�. Let � ≤ �1−� and let � be the
minimal �-best response set of Γ. If � is suiciently large and
� is suiciently small, the perturbed process ��� puts arbitrarily
high probability on a subset Θ∗ ⊆ Θ such that �(Θ∗) ⊆ �.
Proof. Observe that if R�� = R�, then the result follows. In
the sequel, we assume that R�� ⊂ R�. As in the proof of
heorem 4, we break the proof into three parts.
(1) We give a lower bound on �(R��). By the same
reasoning as in the proof ofheorem 4, it follows that �(R��)
is such that �(R��) ≥ ⌈(1 − �)(2� + 1)⌉.
(2) We give an upper bound on ��∗(R��). Observe that
if � = 2, both processes ��� and ��� coincide. By the same
reasoning as in the proof ofheorem 4, it follows that if � = 2
then ��∗(R��) ≤ ⌈�(2� + 1)⌉. Now, assume that � > 2. Fix
a state � ∉ R�� and a class ��. Assume that, in a location
�� ∈ �, (� − 1) agents � ∉ �� mutate and choose actions
in ��. hen, agent � ∈ �� located in � ∈ �(��) believes that
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the probability to be matched with agents playing a vector of
actions contained in�−� is∑�−�∈�−� �
�
−�(�−�) = (1/(2�+1))�−1.
Now, consider � ≤ 2� + 1 consecutive locations in �(�, �)
denoted by ��, � ∈ {1, . . . , �}. Assume that in each of these
locations (� − 1) agents � ∉ �� mutate and choose actions
in ��. hen, agent � ∈ �� located in � such that � ∈ �(��) for
each � ∈ {1, . . . , �} believes that the probability to bematched
with agents playing a vector of actions contained in �−� is
∑�−�∈�−� �
�
−�(�−�) = (�/(2�+1))�−1. By deinition of aminimal
�-best response set, agent � has at least one strategy �� ∈ �� as
a pure best response to ��−� ater that all agents � ∉ �� located
in �∗ ≤ 2� + 1 consecutive locations in �(�, �) belonging
to �(�) mutate and choose actions in �� if �∗ is such that
(�∗/(2� + 1))�−1 ≥ �. Set �∗ = ⌈�1/(�−1)(2� + 1)⌉. Since
� ≤ �1−�, if in �∗ consecutive locations every agent � ∉ ��
mutates and chooses an action in ��, then every agent � ∈ ��
located in each of these locations chooses an action in ��. By
inertia, it is then possible to reach a state in which an action
proile contained in � is played in �∗ consecutive locations
in �(�, �). From such a state, it is possible to reach a state in
R
�
� without additional mutation. Indeed, since � ≤ �1−� and
� > 2, we necessarily have �∗ ≤ �. Hence, ��(R��) is such
that ��(R��) ≤ (� − 1)⌈�1/(�−1)(2� + 1)⌉.
(3) In order to conclude, it is suicient to show that
⌈(1 − �) (2� + 1)⌉ > (� − 1) ⌈�1/(�−1) (2� + 1)⌉ . (11)
A suicient condition to obtain inequality (11) is that
1 − � > (� − 1) �1/(�−1) + � − 12� + 1 . (12)
Inequality (12) is satisied provided� is suiciently large since
by hypothesis� ≤ �1−�, and, by deinition of aminimal�-best
response set, we have 1 − � > 1 − �.
he following result is an immediate application of
heorem 6.
Corollary 7. Let Γ be a inite �-person game and �(�, �)
a chordal ring of degree 2�. Let �∗ be a strict �-dominant
equilibrium of Γ, where � ≤ ��−1. If � is suiciently large and
� is suiciently small, the perturbed process ��� puts arbitrarily
high probability on a subset Θ∗ ⊆ Θ such that �(Θ∗) = {�∗}.
6. Conclusion
his paper establishes that the concept of minimal �-best
response set is useful to study the long-run outcomes of a
process when agents are arranged on a chordal ring and
follow a myopic best response rule with inertia. In particular,
it allows us to obtain results for the whole class of inite �-
person games. Even if predictions are not necessarily sharp
(since a minimal �-best response set may become large when
� decreases), those results make easier the identiication of
stochastically stable states. he paper also highlights that
predictions depend on the assumptionsmade by agents about
the matching rule. From this point of view, it is possible to
establish a connection between these results and the results
obtained in Durieu et al. [4]. his paper considers a ictitious
play model with bounded memory and sample as in Young’s
[12]. Two processes are studied. On the one hand, it is
assumed that each agent believes that, in every period, his
opponents play independently. On the other hand, each agent
believes that, in every period, the play of his opponents is
correlated. Durieu et al. show that the concept of �-best
response set allows establishing predictions about the long-
run outcomes of both processes. Furthermore, as in the
present paper, there exists a similar gap between predictions
obtained for each process.his conveys the idea that sampling
in memory and believing that opponents correlate their
actions (play independently resp.) has the same efect as
believing that players are drawn jointly (independently resp.)
in neighborhood to play the game.
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